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In a world supposedly marked by globalization, fragmentation, increasing 
complexity and speed, political life has undergone a transition from “government to 
governance”. At least, this has become the core assumption of an increasing amount of 
social and political theory. A core concept in the debate about this transition from 
government to governance is the concept of “network”. All though notoriously evasive 
and metaphoric the concept of network has been given the duty of explaining the core of 
the transition from government to governance as a movement away from both state and 
market towards the use of networks to reach and uphold political – collectively binding – 
decisions. All though still an issue of debate, it seems fair to say that this claim about the 
rise of network governance constitutes the core of a research programme under 
construction, loosely coupling researchers from such diverse fields as IR (Rosenau 1969; 
Rosenau and Czempiel 1992), EU-studies (Peterson 1995; Rise-Kappen 1996; Sbragia 
2000), public administration (Rhodes 1997; Bogason 2000; Rhodes 2000), institutional 
theory (March and Olsen 1995),poststructuralist political theory (Hardt and Negri 2000)) 
and sociology, broadly speaking (Castells 1997; Luhmann 1997).  
However, critical voices has been leveled against network governance from the 
perspective of democratic theory (or normative political theory in a wider sense), since 
network governance does not guarantee the democratic virtues associated with the 
traditional decision-making procedures of state (constitutional) institutions or even 
sometimes associated with market. But apart from the fact that network governance is 
“not state” and “not market” it often tends to be less clear what exactly the problem is 
with network governance. Criticism tends to circle around notions of “closure”, 
“inaccessibility”, “limited or no accountability” and so forth. Two things may be noted 
here. First, that the democratic principles used for this assessment is often less than clear. 
This may be a somewhat trivial observation, but none the less a relevant one. More 
importantly however, is the fact that when the democratic principles referred to do seem 
reasonably clear, they almost always fall within the participatory or deliberative strand of 
democratic theory. Assessments from an alternative perspective – such as elite theory – 
are not often seen (Etzioni-Halevy 2003).         
   This paper seeks to contribute to such an assessment of network governance 
from the perspective of elite theory. Perhaps not surprisingly, the assessment of network 
governance turns out somewhat more favorable than is usually the case. Network 
governance is certainly not without problems, but it is in many ways a democratically 
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viable response to the challenges of modern society. In order to state this claim, it seems 
important to avoid concerning oneself with the core assumptions of elite theory itself and 
offer some thoughts on the problem with the demands imposed on network governance 
by the more participatory and deliberative strands of democratic theory. To this end, I 
shall focus on the democratic principles associated with the public or publics, since 
almost any criticism against network governance is leveled in the name of the public. 
Obviously, this implies leaving out the many detailed differences between traditions and 
sub-traditions of democratic theory. Instead, the distinction between public(s) and elite(s) 
is made a core distinction of democratic theory and by implication the most important 
distinction for an assessment of network governance. In light of these considerations, the 
paper proceeds through four steps: 1) clarification of the notion of network governance 2) 
assessing network governance from the viewpoint of the democratic theory of the public 
and 3) assessing network governance from the viewpoint of the democratic theory of 
elites.    
 
Network governance – society, rule and state 
 
As mentioned, the debate on the change from government to governance is very 
inclusive and comprises literature from relatively different strands of research. Moreover, 
the conceptual framework around the basic notion about the change from government to 
governance is far from always as precise as one could hope for. One of the more 
promising attempts in this regard is the use of modern systems theory (to a very large 
parted framed by Niklas Luhmann) as a foundation for the establishment of some basic 
propositions implicated in the transition from government to governance. At least, the 
following takes such an approach as its cue, all though it should be noted that the 
propositions differ somewhat from earlier work in this direction, mainly associated with 
the so-called “Dutch school” of governance studies, (Koimann 1993; Kooiman 2000). 
This is mainly due to the fact that the use of modern systems theory has been somewhat 
superficial so far. Following modern systems theory more closely, some of the basic 
propositions implicated in the transition from government to governance would be the 
following, employing a simple distinction between form of society, form of rule and form 
of state.   
 
1) A functionally differentiated world society (form of society) 
 
As a sociologist, Luhmanns primary enterprise was a theory of society. In this 
respect, his magnum opus “Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft” (Luhmann 1997) is to be 
regarded as the consummation of the work he began approximately 30 years earlier. Two 
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points are especially important in this context. First, that there is only one society; world 
society. Secondly, that the primary form of differentiation within this world society is 
functional differentiation.  
As regards the notion of world society, Luhmann’s claim is still all but accepted. 
The notion of society traditionally implies a territorially delimited space corresponding 
more or less to that of the state. Or in other words: the notion of society was always tied 
to the notion of state. For Luhmann, society has long since gone beyond the state in the 
sense that society has seized to be dependent upon the territorial fixation that is the core 
of the state. Society has become deterritorialized to such a degree that it only finds it 
territorial limitation literally speaking at the end of the world. The intermediary account 
in this argument is that society exists of nothing but communication and since society 
only consists of communication, world society comes into being the minute the world is 
discovered as one common “sphere of meaningful communication”. In this instant, any 
communication is potentially reachable from any other communication. When exactly 
this takes place is a matter of empirical debate, particularly about the development of 
communication media (in a wide sense), but if one accepts the premise it should be 
possible to see that society seizes to be dependent on territorial fixation and becomes a 
world society. 
The second point about society also goes against common knowledge about 
society. Almost any other concept of society implies some sort of normative of functional 
integration within the territorially delimited space. For Luhmann however, world society 
has no integrative force to bridge is differentiating force. To view society in terms of its 
form of differentiation – and certainly also functional differentiation – is a classic 
sociological enterprise. But whereas the classic studies within sociology tended to see 
differentiation as an aporia of modern society to be overcome, Luhmann sees no unity of 
beyond differentiation, either in the form of normative or mechanic integration. This 
rejection of unity pushes the argument back into the theory of communication and to put 
a long story short; to the claim that communication can never be identical with itself in 
the final instance. The relevant question then becomes what form of differentiation is 
dominant in a society at a certain point in time and for Luhmann, the primary form of 
differentiation has been functional differentiation since that beginning of the modernity 
that we have not yet left. In modern systems theory, functional differentiation is taken to 
mean the gradual establishment of systems that are operationally closed around 
symbolically generalized media (dependent on, but not reducible to, technological 
media). The system of politics is closed around the medium of power, the system of law 
around the medium of right, the system of media around the medium of news, economy 
around money, science around truth and so on. These functional systems are all 
established at the level of society itself, i.e. with global reach, which is to say that there is 
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no unification “beyond” or “above” the communicative orientation of these systems 
within society, since they divide society up completely within itself.           
 The evolution of a functionally differentiated world society is – from the vantage 
point of modern systems theory – to be regarded as the basic dynamic from which the 
different strengths and weaknesses of modernity arise. To be sure, functional 
differentiation is by no means an invention of modern systems theory. Within political 
science, functional differentiation was more or less explicitly always the core concern in 
the American discussions about the (semi-)autonomous policy-specific “compartments” 
and “segments”. Compare for example the following to recent discussion about networks: 
“The policy-making process is in reality a series of vertical compartments or segments – 
each segment inhabited by a different set of groups or by the general public.”(Richardson 
and Jordan 1979). Such discussions were also inherent to the famous notion of the “iron 
triangle” coined by Lowi in the 1960’s. Or some years later: “Much of the domestic 
policy of the United States can be explained by the existence of these functionally 
specific policy subsystems.” (Peters 1986, my italics). Obviously, not only American 
domestic policy, but also European (and specifically northern European) corporatism 
gave much thought to issue of functional differentiation. However, the claim of modern 
systems theory is somewhat more radical. Whereas the literature on segments and 
corporatism always tended to see functional differentiation as a dynamic internal to the 
state and its territorial delimitation, modern systems theory basically claims that 
functional differentiation has by far trumped territorial differentiation, replacing more or 
less state-specific segments for the big functional systems of world society. As a 
consequence, the challenges facing anyone trying to steer a functionally closed social 
order from the outside has become much greater.            
 
2) Negotiation and networks (form of rule) 
 
 It is only when we introduce the concepts of steering or coordination that 
governance comes into play. After all, governance means nothing but steering (Rhodes 
1997). But it is important to recognize that the literature on governance more or less 
explicitly poses the problem of steering as a problem relating to functional differentiation 
– as was also the case with the literature on segments and corporatism which forms to 
most immediate ancestor to the debate on governance. All though not a definition often 
used, I should like to define the core of network governance as the question of the 
possibilities of steering and coordination under the conditions of functional 
differentiation. Such a statement may also shed some light on both the affinity and the 
difference between the debate on governance and the earlier writings on both pluralism, 
segments and corporatism: they all share a common interest in the effects of functional 
differentiation on steering and coordination, but whereas earlier discussions still 
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perceived territorial differentiation to be primary and the functional compartments to be 
circumscribed by the state, functional differentiation has now overpowered the exclusive 
territorial differentiation of states by far. The question then becomes: how is coordination 
and steering possible under conditions of such a radical functional differentiation? 
 In a very entertaining book on the theory of steering, Helmut Willke has shown 
that an A-team of political science stretching from Dahl & Lindblom to Renate Mayntz 
has all operated with a basic distinction between three forms of coordination and steering: 
hierarchy (also called state or bureaucracy), market and either network or negations 
(Willke 1998: 88). To this list we may add recent writings on governance (Jessop 1997; 
Rhodes 1997). Obviously, this is not all that surprising since this distinction derives 
directly from the standard vision of world affairs within political science: that of the 
distinction between state, market and civil society. To put it bluntly: if you need steering 
or coordination, there are only three ways to go about it: you can rely on state, market or 
civil society, according to political science.  
 Hierarchy (exclusive or inclusive) achieves steering through a chain of formal 
competencies that ultimately derives from a sovereign. The medium of steering and 
coordination is order and command. The market achieves steering and coordination 
ultimately based on supposed capacity of the market to produce an optimum between 
supply and demand. The medium here is money (or at least payment). In civil society, 
steering or coordination is achieved through something akin to solidarity, consensus 
being the medium of steering and coordination. Now, the literature on network 
governance is solidly rooted within this tradition. In some cases network governance 
means simply steering or coordination achieved through the mechanisms associated with 
civil society. In other cases network governance is posed as a fourth distinct form of 
coordination and steering relying on negotiation and finally in some cases with the 
mixing of the three arch-types. In any case, the transition from government to governance 
means simply that steering or coordination not based on hierarchy becomes more and 
more to fore – not least as a state strategy - as functional differentiation increases. 
Network governance in particular, implies that networks either as civil society, 
negotiation and/or mixing comes to the fore as a mode of steering and coordination under 
conditions of functional differentiation.   
 But, taking modern systems theory as the foundation for a theory on network 
governance, some modifications are needed. From the systems theoretical perspective, 
the distinction between state, market and civil society is nothing but and outdated 
semantic with no reference to the present form of differentiation in society. The world is 
not differentiated into state, market and civil society and none of these concepts make 
reference to actually operative social systems. Consequently, framing the question of 
network governance within this old distinction implies loosing any potential of coming to 
terms with the really important transition: the breakthrough of functional differentiation 
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as a primary form of differentiation. Framing the question within the functionally 
differentiated world society then, implies observing functional systems also as forms of 
coordination and steering. 
 Or in other words: we do not have a state, but we do have a political system 
achieving coordination and steering through a medium of political power coded as 
government and opposition. We do also have an economic system (not the same as a 
market) based on the medium of money. We do not, however, have a civil society. In 
systems theory, there is no functional system even vaguely resembling civil society. 
Instead, we have the whole array of other functional systems: family, science, media, law 
etc. And the point is that steering and coordination can also be achieved through these 
systems. The medium of family is love and even though it may not please the romantics it 
does not take much stretching of the imagination to imagine steering and coordination by 
love. In fact, this what many modern organizations have been doing for some time now 
(Andersen and Born 2001). It should be even easier to imagine steering or coordination 
by truth. Just take a scientific conference as an example. The same goes for the news of 
the media system and the right of the system of law (in fact, the order and command 
derives from the system of law, not from politics). In general the point is this: if there is a 
functional system (and just which and how many is an empirical question), it also works 
as a form of steering and coordination. This is what functional systems do, even though 
the argument goes like this in the peculiar systems theoretical tongue: “functional 
systems make the otherwise unlikely event of communication more likely.”     
   Now, this does not say much about network governance specifically. None of the 
big functional subsystems of world society are inherently network-like in the sense 
proposed by the literature in network governance. Systems theoretically speaking, 
networks must be regarded as interaction systems. Besides functional subsystems of 
society, systems theory proposes organizations and interaction systems as the two other 
possible forms of social systems. Organizations are defined more or less in line with 
traditional organization theory and interaction-systems as based on face-to-face 
communication. The coordination and steering achieved by functional systems is in fact 
coordination between such social systems or directly between psychic systems (systems 
theory does not use terms like “subject” or “individual”) by way of their symbolically 
generalized media (which may in this way also be understood as the source of power 
within these systems). The capacity of functional systems to perform such coordination is 
the fundamental strength of functional differentiation.  
 However, when steering not within, but between functional systems is the issue, 
problems arise. Basically, the big functional subsystems of world society cannot be 
steered from the outside, which provides the systems theoretical equivalent to the crisis of 
politics since the system of politics is just one system among other functional systems. 
But functional systems may be structurally or operatively coupled. Structural coupling 
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may be achieved by non-systemic phenomena such as constitutions coupling the system 
of law to the system of politics. But the more efficient coupling between functional 
systems can only be achieved by other systems, i.e. organizations and interaction systems. 
Organizations work by way of the usual characteristics: inclusion and exclusion through 
membership, establishment of programmes and procedures forming an inclusive 
hierarchy and the production of decisions. Interaction systems on the other hand, closely 
resemble face-to-face communication in systems theory. But it would be wrong not to 
perceive as interaction systems as also being technologically mediated at other times. The 
important point is that we are dealing with the temporally and spatially limited 
communication that displays none of the characteristics of formal organization.       
 The issue at stake in network governance then becomes: if trying to achieve 
coordination and steering between functionally delimited systems, should one go for 
formal organization or networks, i.e. interaction systems? Here, the strength of the 
network approach seems to be based on this dilemma: the organizations of each 
functional system cannot be coupled be other organizations (because we would then have 
instance of a new organizations dissolving the original organizations). But the temporally 
in spatially limited coupling achieved by an interaction system can in fact be achieved 
without destroying the operational autonomy of the implied organizations. But on the 
other hand this temporal and spatial limitation is also the problem, if one has great 
expectations to the coordination and steering performance, simply because interaction 
systems cannot breach the operational autonomy of the systems coupled.  But again: 
functional differentiation is very often very effective. So, viewed only from the 
perspective of the effectiveness of communication the trick is exactly to coordinate 
between, but not counter to the functionally differentiated systems. Whether this is also 
acceptable from the standpoint of the legitimacy of communication is another issue – 
soon to be taken up.    
 
3) The  state is not necessarily being hollowed out or eroded (form of state) 
 
 A final issue is the role of the state. As a recent state of the art work on 
governance has noted, governance is about “…the conceptual or theoretical 
representation of co-ordination of social systems and, for the most part, the role of the 
state in that process” (Pierre 2000: 3). From the systems theoretical point of view, we 
should specify that we take this issue to be about certain specific organizations – not 
simply “state”- i.e. political parties and administrative bodies. The basic problem is of, 
course, that the basic steering and coordination capacity commonly expected of such 
organizations cannot be achieved in a situation where the system of politics has become 
just one functional system not even “primus inter pares” but just “inter pares”. More 
specifically, the problem is that the territorial differentiation that serves as a basis for 
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these organizations has been completely overrun by the deterritorializing dynamic of 
other functional systems (Esmark 2003, forthcoming).  
 This ties the discussion of network governance into the discussion about 
globalization (a functionally differentiated world society is one of the most radical global 
diagnoses around) and in particular the issue of the “loss of sovereignty” (Sassen 1996) 
or the “hollowing out of the state” (Rhodes 1997). And to be sure, a hallmark of network 
governance theory is that the state can no longer rely on its preference for formal 
organization (or simply bureaucracy) as a means of steering. However, the point here is 
that we are dealing not so much with loss of sovereignty or a hollowing out, as a 
transformation of the form of state. Referring to the terms coined by Helmut Willke, we 
may call this new form of state the “ironic state” or the “supervisory state” (meaning not 
supervision as control, but something more akin to academic supervision). All though 
more specific based on networks, this approach bears some resemblance to what has also 
been called “flexible government” (Peters 1996). In short, this is the state that uses 
network governance as a strategy of steering or coordination in accordance with the place 
taken up by politics in a functionally differentiated world society. Such a state tries to set 
up structural and operative couplings between organizations from different functional 
systems, or, as Willke calls it, tries to employ decentered context-steering. That is, 
providing coordination and steering by setting up negotiation systems (networks, 
interactions systems) between functionally autonomous systems:  
 
“Decentered context-steering takes seriously the fact that no single functional system, not 
even that of politics, has the competencies and power to provide the necessary context-
setting in a polycentric society. Context-setting can only be provided through the 
interaction between autonomous and reflexive actors in self-organizing negotiation 
systems. Context-steering can thus be understood as the resonant self-organizing of self-
organizing systems” (Willke 1997: 142).    
     
 
The democratic theory of the public(s) 
 
As with democratic theory in general, the etymological enterprise concerning a 
core concept would take as back to the Greeks. But in the case of the public there is one 
person which has become more or less synonymous with the modern democratic theory 
of the public, namely Jürgen Habermas. From his original thesis about “The 
Transformation of The Public Sphere” (Habermas 1962) past communicative action 
(Habermas 1995-97 [1981]) and discourse ethics (Habermas 1991) to the current writings 
about postnationalism (and the EU) (Habermas 1998) runs a concern with the proper 
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democratic form of political communication. Taking Habermas as the quintessential 
representative of the democratic theory of the public, the first and most important 
observation is that the democratic theory of the public is first and foremost a theory about 
the proper form of political communication. It is not a theory about political decisions as 
such. Or rather: the framework of political decision-making is to a large extent the 
traditional “constitutional essentials”. What the democratic theory of the public is 
concerned with is the mechanisms beyond the constitutional essentials that will ensure a 
continuing congruence between political decisions and the “will of the people” – or 
strictly speaking; the sovereignty of the people. The claim laid down by the democratic 
theory of the public is that the driving principle of western democracy, both in and 
beyond the constitutional essentials, is that of public reason (Rawls 1993: 212-254; 
Rawls 1997).  
 It is not surprising then, that the democratic theory of the public has become more 
or less synonymous with deliberative democracy (Elster 1998; Eriksen and Weigaard 
2003). Deliberative democracy, however, has a somewhat fuzzy relationship with 
participatory democracy. Even though the two strands of thought should be seen as a 
common set, as is sometimes the case, they do share some trademarks. The democratic 
theory of the public does not hold participation to be a core value in itself, but rather a 
means to an end. A sufficient level of participation is necessary for a public sphere to 
function properly, but the concern here is not so much with the realization or 
development of mans true nature. Different version of the democratic theory of the public 
has different concerns about the issue of participation, but it tends to always be an issue, 
all though not the primary one. The core concern is that of public reason.  
 It is important to stress the latter part of this principle. Whereas the notion of 
public and publicity has an integral part of the language of democratic legitimacy, as 
spoken in particular by politicians, journalists and researchers, it tends to be forgotten 
that the question is not just whether political communication is made public, but whether 
political communication conforms to a certain form of communication, namely that of 
reasoning. As Habermas states, this medium of communication is historically unique and 
without any predecessors. It implies that political communication should conform to 
certain standards that we may associate with an ideal of rational reflexivity. To be sure, 
Habermas has presented variations on this theme throughout his æuvre, such as the 
“communicative rationality” or “discourse ethics”, but we are basically dealing with an 
attempt to transform scientific enlightenment ideal into practical standards of 
communication in direct opposition to the use of political communication as propaganda 
(as represented arc-typically by Harold Lasswell). This ideal – or principle – may be 
aided by a constitutional framework, but can in now way be secured by such a 
framework. Public reason goes beyond the constitutional framework and presents what 
we might call a practical ideal, taking our clue from Rawls:      
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”That public reason should be understood an honored by citizens is not, of course, a 
matter of law. As an ideal conception of citizenship for a constitutional democratic 
regime, it presents how things might be./-../It describes what is possible an can be, yet 
may never be, though no less fundamental for that.” (Rawls 1997) 
 
To this we may add that public reason in a modern society should not only be 
honored by citizens, but certainly also by politicians and journalists/editors. That Rawls 
tends to assign the duty of public reason to citizens is very telling. Being a (or perhaps the 
quintessential) representative of anglo-american liberal political theory he seems to 
equate the public with the citizenry or simply “the people” within a system of rule, 
stressing the rights of the people but certainly also the limitations to these rights. In 
contrast, the continental tradition represented by Habermas implies that we do not 
associate the public simply with the people, but with a public sphere properly speaking, 
of which the people is just a part.  
A public sphere is in its core a relation between publicists and audience 
(“publikum” in german). The publicist makes the public sphere possible simply by 
making political issues public. In principle, this may imply simply yelling from atop a 
barrel at the town square. However, “making public” will almost always imply the use of 
technological media of dissemination, ranging from leaflets to the internet. The audience 
on their part is not an inactive audience, but ideally an audience taking part in the 
deliberation on the issue made public. Much has been said about the fact that the 
empirical examples of existing public spheres made by Habermas is all pre-modern (the 
agora of the Greek city-state, English coffee-houses etc.) and the fact remains that in 
some sense, the perfect realization of the public sphere implies only a relation between 
publicists and audience and everything else may very quickly become a history of the 
Fall, as was the case in Habermas’ original work. 
But obviously, much effort has also been put into the adjustment of the ideal to 
modern times, especially the functional differentiation between a modern system of 
politics and a no less distinct system of media. In the original public sphere there is 
basically no difference between the politician and the publicist. They are one and the 
same. But with the functional differentiation between politics and journalists/editors in 
primary control of ever more powerful dissemination media, the theory of the public 
sphere has adjusted the principle of public reason the apply to at least three parties: 
politicians (including their parties), journalists/editors (including their newspaper or 
broadcasting organizations) and the people (including their interest organizations and 
new social movements). Consequently, the principle of public reason applies to all of 
these, assigning specific duties to each of them. From this derives the duty of politicians 
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not to “flee the public eye”, the idea of journalists as the “fourth branch” or “watchdog” 
and the idea of political involvement as a sort of civic duty.       
All of this is obviously tied closely into the process of modern state building. The 
fact that the public sphere is most often referred to in the singular hints at the fact that it 
is almost always implicitly given as a national public. Even tough originally conceived of 
in relation to smaller political communities, the adjustment of the principle of public 
reason to modernity tied the notion of the public sphere almost exclusively to the nation-
state. And more importantly: it would seem that the realization of a public sphere within 
the confines of the nation-state, all though maybe not perfect, was the public sphere’s 
finest hour. But with the advent of globalization and regionalization, this national 
delimitation of the public has been the source many a democratic concern to which I shall 
return on the section on the EU. But generally speaking, a public sphere can in principle 
be established at very different levels of territorial extensiveness. The theory is not 
necessarily a theory of the (national) public, but may include many publics. Setting aside 
the territorial extension of the form of rule under scrutiny for the moment though, we 
may instead ask how network governance as a form of rule in itself looks from the 
vantage point of the democratic theory of the public(s).      
 
 
Ф  Ф  Ф 
 
It would seem that the network governance produces more democratic losses than 
gains as seen from the democratic theory of the public. First and foremost; network 
governance exclusive. In a modern public sphere, inclusion only demands citizenship. In 
contrast, networks always have limited accessibility. If taken to the letter, a public sphere 
should include everyone affected by the issues reasoned on. But in network governance, 
someone (and usually quite a lot) affected, is excluded. This may also be framed as a 
problem of closure. Public reason implies openness and accessibility to information, 
whereas networks are often a closed business. Closure was always also a problem within 
formal government, but at least we do have quite a few laws on the matter here. Another 
problem is the possible lack of transparency and accountability in decision-making. 
Always hailed as the arch-virtue of formal government, transparency and accountability 
are not easily achieved by the informal procedures and memberships of networks. The 
most important problem however, concerns the medium of communication, i.e. rational 
reflexivity. The problem with networks is that they always operate within a functionally 
specific (often couched as policy-specific) logic of communication and decision-making. 
There is more than just a reminiscence of Habermas’ distinction between communicative 
rationality and strategic rationality at work here.    
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This antithetic relationship between the demands set forth by the idea of a public 
sphere and the existence of networks as particular mode of governance should not 
surprise us, as it has always been an integral part of the democratic theory of the public 
itself. Public reason is basically a medium of communication designed to bridge 
differentiation and integrate individuals into a political community. In relation to 
functional differentiation, public reason is basically a symbolically generalized meta-
medium supposedly capable of overcoding all the different symbolically generalized 
media on which the functional subsystems of society rest. At this level of abstraction at 
least, public reason proposes the very opposite of network governance: to coordinate and 
steer not in concordance with functional differentiation, but counter to functional 
differentiation.  
      This was also the core of the debate between Habermas and Luhmann. Briefly 
put, Luhmann held the high hopes of Habermas to be an unfortunate example of critical 
theory “...to concerned with the world as it is not, and not enough concerned with the 
world as it is.” For Luhmann, public reason will not be able to establish itself as a 
medium bridging functional differentiation. For a medium to become effective, systems 
have to be build around it. And there is no system build around the medium of public 
reason. And furthermore: if public reason were to achieve what is proposed by its 
democratic theory, it would have to establish itself not only as a functional system, but as 
no less than world society.    
That is not to say that publics do not play a part in systems theory. But the faith in 
their democratic capacity is somewhat more limited. Firstly, we may say that publics may 
arise as interaction systems, that is; momentary instances of face-to-face communication. 
This should not surprise us, since the arch-typical examples mentioned all displayed the 
characteristics of interaction systems. The problem is however, that interaction systems 
are temporally and spatially outgunned by both functional systems and organizations, 
making their potential coupling of the latter momentary and local. Secondly, we may say 
that public reason is indeed used as a medium of communication by functional 
subsystems of society, but that its use conforms to the operative logics of these systems 
themselves. That is: rational reflexivity is transformed into the functionally specific self-
reflexivity of other systems. This is exactly what is happening when we observe 
politicians making decisions with reference to a “public opinion” formed not in a true 
public sphere, but by the polling techniques of consultants hired by the politicians or just 
by outright propaganda technique. This is what happens when journalists claim to act in 
the name of the public without any other concern than the next big story and the front 
page. To some extent, this is also what happens when companies takes on “public 
responsibility” even though profit is and should be their only concern.  
Luhmann’s evaluation of this is ambivalent. On the one hand, public reason works 
as a “concealing strategy”, softening up the harshness of a simple functional logic in 
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itself. Imagine a politician showing blatant disregard for the public and proclaiming no 
other interest than getting elected. As such, public reason may make functional systems 
less effective. There is definitely something to be said for functional differentiation. The 
achievements of modernity have in no small part to do with fact that politicians does not 
care about anything than the next election, journalists with the front page and capitalists 
only with profit. It is such implications that have earned Luhmann the reputation as a 
reactionary and even right-wing thinker. For some, contemplating the possible benefits of 
functional differentiation warrants such a label, but there is no need to discuss this further 
here. On the other hand, Luhmann is not blind to the fact that the “blind” operational 
logics of functional systems poses and array of problems (the one he developed most 
thoroughly was the environmental problem). And public reason may actually play a 
positive part here. Even though public reason will not replace the media of the functional 
systems themselves, it introduces a self-reflexivity that is somewhat common to different 
systems and thus gives them a sort of common orientation. But if this works, it because 
public reason here begins to work somewhat like structural and operative couplings, 
which is your best bet of achieving coordination under the conditions of functional 
differentiation and thus the systems theoretical equivalent to network governance. But the 
democratic theory of the public has a very hard time accepting a mode of coordination or 
steering designed to be in accordance with functional differentiation, since the basic aim 
is to counter such differentiation. Now, let us look at a democratic theory with a very 
different take on the democratic possibilities of functional differentiation.  
 
The democratic theory of the elite(s) 
 
In the seminal of the recent works on democratic elite theory, the main adversary 
is certainly not the democratic theory of the public, but the theory of class struggle 
(Etzioni-Halevy 1993: 13-53). Ten years later, it would seem however that the 
democratic theory of the public is the more likely candidate for a near-hegemony when it 
comes to assessments of different forms of rule and state, notwithstanding the continuing 
importance of the theory of class struggle in many academic debates. Framing the 
question in this way introduces the division between public and elite as the key 
distinction in democratic theory. In a broad sense, such a division traces back to the 
traditional distinction between republicanism (with elements of classical democracy) and 
liberalism (Held 2000). But the emphasis here is more on the current visions of public 
and elite than the broader democratic paradigms of which they are a part. The point in 
both cases is that formal institutional (constitutional) arrangements of democracy such as 
freedom of speech, of organization, free elections etc. are not enough to secure a sound 
democratic rule - and not even the most important. Instead, democracy is defined by a 
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“core principle” of western democracy to be found both in and beyond the constitutional 
essentials. Theses principles are public reasoning and elite autonomy, respectively.  
The stance of democratic elite theory towards the theory of the public, however, 
has not been taken with the same rigor and vigor as the stance towards the theory of class 
struggle (and with it the vision of direct democracy, we may assume). It would even seem 
that the concern for the public is seen as something to be incorporated into democratic 
elite theory, as opposed to both class struggle and classic elite theory. However, “the 
public” in this line of reasoning is taken to mean something very akin to “the people” or 
“the mass” within a system of rule. In other words, the public is understood in the anglo-
american way as the people, the general citizenry and not as conjunction of politicians, 
journalists and people using public reason as a specific means of communication. Within 
the framework of democratic elite theory the public thus becomes a “third level” in the 
general classification within a system of rule, ranging from elite over sub-elite to the 
residual non-elite (public). From this perspective, the importance of the public lies in the 
fact that it provides the raw material for recruitment to elites and sub-elites. But 
 
“…even if members of the public do not become elites they are still important in elite 
struggles. Their importance lies in the climate of opinion and the support they either lend 
or do not lend to those who conduct the struggles.” (Etzioni-Halevy 1993: 47) 
 
Indeed, “…relative elite autonomy and the democratic role of the public go hand 
in hand” (Ibid: 107). As seen from the eyes of elite theory, the “ultimate test of 
importance of the public in a democracy is its ability to make elites responsive to its own 
whishes” (Ibid: 108). Such responsiveness is to be secured through strong linkages or 
couplings between elites and the public. In other words, democratic elite theory takes on 
one of the core concerns of the democratic theory of the public: that of accountability. 
Elites must at least be accountable to the public, defined as 
 
“…the public standing in judgment over the elite’s performance and its ability to weaken, 
demote or dismiss the elites when it is dissatisfied with its performance” (Etzioni-Halevy 
2001: 167).  
 
In short, democratic elite theory is to some extent also a democratic theory of the 
public. However, it is important to note that this view on the public as a necessary 
sustaining principle departs in an important way from a democratic theory based 
fundamentally on public reason. For democratic elite theory, the core of democracy is not 
public reason, but elite autonomy. The public, in this view, is essentially an environment 
for elite autonomy. Elites have to be linked to the public in two ways: elites must be open 
to recruitment from the public and the public should be able to judge the performance of 
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elites (ultimately toppling them, if necessary).  But this does not amount a fully fledged 
democratic theory proposing public reason as the core principle of democracy. Rather, 
the principle of public reason taken to the letter would be at odds with the core principle 
proposed by democratic elite theory: that of the autonomy of elites. What democratic elite 
theory proposes is that a reduced version of the democratic theory of the public must be 
taken into account. And in the context of this paper, the important point is that the 
democratic concerns leveled against network governance do not seem to stem from the 
core principle of elite autonomy itself, but rather from the imported aspects of the 
democratic theory of the public. 
Democratic elite theory revolves around the idea that the core of western liberal 
democracy is the institutionalization of the relative autonomy of elites (and sub-elites). 
Ultimately, the relative autonomy of elites is important, because it prevents a system of 
rule from forming into a concerted power structure. In other words, elite autonomy is 
seen to give a system of rule a “progressive potential” (Etzioni-Halevy 1993: 199). The 
relative autonomy of elites resides in an inordinate active control of coercive, material, 
administrative and or symbolic resources (=power). Such elites may by localized within 
or outside organizations, but elites are never synonymous with organizations. The elite 
comprises only the very few individuals that are “at the top of the pyramid” within the 
organization or set themselves apart from the organization altogether.  Elite autonomy is 
in principle autonomy from anyone, but of particular interest is the autonomy from the 
institutions of state and within the institutions of state from the government itself 
(Etzioni-Halevy 1993: 94-102).     
The bold claim of democratic elite theory is that the relative autonomy of elites is 
in essence the over-arching meta-principle of liberal democracy. The relative autonomy 
of elites is not simply an additive, but what free and competitive elections, civil liberties 
and separation of powers are in reality all about. Or in other words: as seen from 
democratic elite theory, the true nature of the constitutional essentials of democracy is to 
provide the “rationale and mechanisms” for the activity of autonomous elites. Just as 
within the democratic theory of the public, we find here a reading of the constitutional 
essentials as basically a supportive framework for the real core of democracy. And just as 
in the democratic theory of the public, the constitutional essentials in themselves are not 
sufficient. Constitutional essentials are a necessary but not a sufficient condition of 
democracy. Instead, we have to look at the operative level of autonomy gained by the 
different elites within the constitutional framework.  
At this point, we may note something very interesting as seen from the 
perspective of modern systems theory. It would seem that the core concern of democratic 
elite theory, when going beyond the constitutional essentials, becomes functional 
differentiation. Such a claim is not stated in democratic elite theory as it stands, but I 
shall none the less advance the claim that democratic elite theory is the first and only 
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democratic theory to pose a sufficient level of functional differentiation as the primary 
condition of democracy. Functional differentiation as it is seen in modern systems theory 
basically refers to the establishment of radically autonomous functional subsystems of 
world society. All though never couched in terms of elites, the basic notion of the radical 
autonomy of these systems seem very much akin to the autonomy requested by 
democratic elite theory. No less so, if we look at the different elites mentioned in 
democratic elite theory: parliamentary elites, media or broadcasting elites, academic 
elites, capitalists, juridical elites etc., corresponding in broad terms to the political 
system, the media system, the scientific system, the economic system and the system of 
law in modern systems theory.  
All though systems theory does not say much about the establishment of elites 
within these systems, functional differentiation seems to be exactly the autonomy of 
elites vis-à-vis other elites within a system of rule that democratic elite theory holds to be 
the core of democracy. Obviously, the level of functional differentiation envisaged by 
modern systems theory may have gone too far since it has “gone global” and left the 
constitutional essential still carried by states (and perhaps in the near future, the EU) 
behind. Other problems may be noted, such as the fact that the level of autonomy 
suggested by systems theory – operational closure – may even be too much for 
democratic elite theory, since it may eradicate corporation all together. Furthermore, 
many concepts of democratic elite theory such as “state”, “civil society” etc. would be 
considered “outdated semantics” from the perspective of modern systems theory. But 
setting these differences aside for the moment, a sufficient level of functional 
differentiation within the framework of constitutional essentials seems to be what 
democratic elite theory is basically asking. And as such, it is the first democratic theory 
to view functional differentiation with its emphasis on autonomy as the core of 
democracy, going beyond former strands of thought in this direction such as pluralism 
and neo-pluralism.    
The terms used by democratic elite theory to discuss whether a sufficient level of 
functional differentiation has been achieved – and thus the primary criteria for assessing a 
system of rule – are subjugation and collusion vs. corporation (Etzioni-Halevy 1993: 109-
121). Subjugation and collusion refers to a situation with insufficient functional 
differentiation. Subjugation arises when the autonomy of elites is infringed upon by the 
practices of government. Or in other words: when other functional systems are not 
sufficiently differentiated from the political system. Collusion arises when the autonomy 
of elites and sub-elites is infringed upon by the ties they develop with each other. Or in 
other words: when there is insufficient functional differentiation between the different 
non-political systems themselves. In the case of subjugation or collusion we have a case 
of “integration” (the traditional sociological counterpart to differentiation) or 
“consensus”. The acceptable alternative to this situation is one of corporation, where 
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elites and sub-elites agree on certain basic rules of the game within which it is still 
possible to uphold autonomy. The systems theoretical parallel to the situation of 
corporation is one of structural or operative couplings between systems.  
Given this framework for judging on the level of democracy in a system of rule, it 
should be possible to see why the compatibility between the democratic theory of the 
public and democratic elite theory is not perhaps less apparent than suggested by the 
latter. In short, the democratic theory of the public is basically an attempt to counter 
functional differentiation exactly with the form of integration and solidarity rejected by 
democratic elite theory. And the fact that this would be a wrongful attempt at 
democratization of functional differentiation was also the core of Luhmanns criticism of 
Habermas. In other words, the distinction between public and elite is underpinned by 
classic distinctions such as (functional) differentiation/integration, autonomy/solidarity 
and division of power/popular sovereignty. Or, to put bluntly: what the democratic theory 
of the public aims to achieve is essentially infringement on elite autonomy by way of the 
principle of public reason. The aim is not to sustain, but to reduce the autonomy of elites. 
Public reason is basically a mechanism to uphold the sovereignty of the people (hence the 
republican ancestry), which is, taken to the letter, incompatible with elite autonomy. 
None the less, elite theory does show some concern for the public which has the odd 
consequence that the assessment of network governance from the standpoint of 
democratic elite theory turns up some negative remarks stemming from the democratic 
theory of the public, and not from the core principle of elite autonomy itself.    
 
 
Ф  Ф  Ф 
  
From the perspective of democratic elite theory, the democratic losses and gains of 
network governance depends on whether network governance should be seen as a case of 
unwanted elite collusion and subjugation or of acceptable elite corporation. At the 
theoretical level, the case for network governance looks very promising. As mentioned 
earlier, network governance implies notions about the forms of steering and coordination 
under conditions of functional differentiation in general and about state capacity for 
steering in particular. Taking the core of network governance to be a form of steering and 
coordination based exactly on the extensive autonomy of the participating actors, it 
would seem that there is a profound congruence between the democratic principle laid 
down by elite theory and the diagnosis of current political life advanced by theories on 
network governance. A governance network is after all a “specified group of 
interdependent, but operationally autonomous actors who interact through negotiations.” 
(Marcussen and Torfing 2003) or the steering based on the self-steering capacity of 
various participants. Such balancing on a knife’s edge between interdependency and 
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autonomy through negotiations is precisely what the notion of corporation in democratic 
elite theory seems to be all about – in contrast to a situation where the balance has 
definitely tipped to interdependence and hence; collusion. To push the point a bit: 
coordination is the way to avoid collusion.  
At the core, the theory of network governance suggests that 1) we can identify 
negotiations as a mode of coordination based precisely on the autonomy of participating 
actors and 2) that such a mode coordination tends to be the most successful under 
conditions of functional differentiation. Of course, there is nothing immanent to the 
notion of network governance suggesting that there will be no threat to autonomy during 
negotiations in networks and that the level of interdependency may rise above what is 
tolerable as seen from democratic elite theory.  
Such concerns has already been expressed from democratic elite theory, referring to 
the “blurring” of boundaries or “symbiosis” between state elites and non-state elites 
involving sponsoring or funding by government agencies. More specifically, such 
symbiosis forms an elite connection “involving a mutual flow of resources between 
government elites or between supranational elites (such as those of the EU) on the one 
hand, and society based elites on the other hand” (Etzioni-Halevy 2003: 13). 
Furthermore, the necessary “hand in hand” relationship between elite autonomy and the 
role of the public may also be threatened by network governance, as network governance 
supposedly diminishes the accountability of elites to the public since the real decision-
maker may be hard to find in a network (Etzioni-Halevy 2003: 15). In other words, the 
leftovers of the democratic theory of the public within democratic elite theory also prove 
to produce the classic concern for lack of openness and transparency.    
I should like to argue however, that such concerns are to a certain degree misplaced. 
Or more specifically: democratic problems stemming from the core principle of elite 
theory seems less than warranted and even the criteria stemming from the democratic 
theory of the public but imported into elite theory may be met by network governance. 
Regarding the issue of collusion, thickened elite connections and to much 
interdependency, the point is that such phenomena are dysfunctional for network 
governance. Or in other words: when the level of interdependency becomes to high, 
network governance begins to transform into something else. Even though the literature 
on network governance does not suggest that elite connections can always be blocked, 
but it does suggest that the network will not work very well, should this happen. In such a 
situation, the network begins to transform into something else instead: a concerted 
structure (organization) which will in all probability display hierarchical trademarks. 
Democratic elite theory has put some emphasis on the fact that networks may be 
sponsored by government elites, or in other words to dependent on the material (and 
potentially also administrative and symbolic) resources of these elites. Towards this end 
it may be noted firstly, that many networks are not sponsored and secondly, that networks 
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funded or even designed by government elites can actually function perfectly without 
actually generating elite connections. One has to distinguish between the network and the 
participating elites. The point is that all though the network may be dependent on 
government sponsoring, the participating elites are not. The sponsoring is in most cases 
very modest, only sufficient to cover the cost of keeping the network running, and of no 
real importance to the participating elites. Of course, the network may degenerate into 
elite connections as it of course a connection. But as acknowledged by democratic elite 
theory, we do also need corporation and the point is that a network is your best shot at 
achieving corporation without collusion. 
The same goes for subjugation. Subjugation seems to be exactly what the use of 
network governance as a state strategy aims to avoid. Here, network governance is 
pushed to the level of steering rather than just coordinating. Or, put in another way: the 
question is how to steer coordination. Steering by government and state institutions is 
typically coined as “meta-governance”, meaning a situation where the state produces, 
uses and nurtures networks to produce policy outcome. In other words, the state does not 
play the game (negotiate) in the network (even though it may also do so), but sets up the 
game (the network). Using a famous metaphor, meta-governance implies “steering, not 
rowing” (Pierre 2000). In principle, any actor can attempt to move from participation in 
coordination to steering, but interest has clustered around state institutions thus far. 
Again, the aim is specify a situation where decisions are produced on the basis of 
autonomy rather then encroachment of autonomy. And precisely as with coordination, 
there is nothing immanent to meta-governance securing that network governance will not 
transform into something less sensitive to the autonomy of different actors, in this case 
steering through orders, which is after all the traditional steering mechanism of state 
institutions (on that note, Etzioni-Halevy’s different empirical examples on subjugation 
all display this same reversal to orders, i.e. restricting the freedom of information, union 
bashing, repoliticizing the bureaucracy, putting pressure on the research freedoms of 
higher education).   
 A positive evaluation of network governance is perhaps even more likely, if we look 
at the propositions from a more clear-cut systems theoretical perspective. Helmut 
Willke’s notion of decentered context-steering is exactly about how to produce more or 
less efficient coordination without infringement of the radical autonomy of operationally 
closed systems. More specifically, such coordination is proposed as the only viable 
solution exactly under conditions of functional differentiation as it is understood in 
systems theory. A network in this context is an interaction system, distinct from 
organizations and the large functional subsystems of society. Network – or interactions 
systems – is temporally and spatially more limited than these other systems, implying that 
they can never bridge the differentiation between these other systems for any longer 
period of time. But none the less, networks provide the possibility of momentary and 
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relatively efficient coordination during the existence of the interaction system. It does not 
take much effort to envisage such network coordination as corporation between elites 
from different functional subsystems and their organizations. 
Not to say that network governance has offered many thoughts on whether actors 
participating in networks are necessarily elites. It is not given that actors participating in 
networks should be considered elites just by virtue of them participating in networks. 
Networks may include participants from all three tiers envisaged in democratic elite 
theory: elite, sub-elite and public (people, laypersons). Thus, we may distinguish between 
the pure forms of elite networks, sub-elite networks and public networks. But often, 
participants will come from different tiers, producing mixed networks. In fact, this quality 
of mixing hints at an important quality in network governance as seen from democratic 
elite theory. Mixed networks are to a large extent a vital mechanism for securing the 
necessary circulation from between the public, sub-elites and elites.  
Here, we are entering the discussion about the concern in democratic elite theory 
stemming more or less directly from the democratic theory of the public: whether elites 
are held properly accountable by the environment of the public. On this point, democratic 
elite theory vests much interest in the new social movements (Etziony-Halevy 1993: 199-
214), (Etzioni-Halevy 2001). In short, democratic elite theory holds that new social 
movements are the most successful way to create elite-public linkages, even though they 
certainly also have their deficiencies in this respect. We may say that the movement itself 
is the linkage, coupling a selected part of the public to an existing elite or forming a new 
one. Compared to the creation of new social movements, democratic elite theory tends to 
look somewhat more negatively as networks. But at base level, networks are simply 
another form of coupling that does not involve the strong ideological identity-formation 
associated both with the classic social movements and the new movements nurtured in 
“identity politics”. By comparison, the outlook of network building are much more 
substantially and temporally limited. One may say that networks in sense come to work 
as the technocratic strategy of the non-elite vs. the ideological strategy of the social 
movement. The trademarks of networks: the limited durability, loose coupling and focus 
more on issues more than causes come to work as a more flexible and variable strategy of 
coupling from elite to non-elite than that of the new social movements. The clearest case 
of such a logic may be found in Hardt & Negri’s notion of “the Multitude” (Hardt and 
Negri 2000). The multitude is the network used as a global strategy of the non-elite 
coined in distinct opposition to the identity-politics of new social movements. In this 
sense, network governance can be seen as a strategic alternative to the building of new 
social movements. In network governance terms, we would then be dealing with 
“networks from below”, that is; networks initiated at the non-elite level. And following 
the general premise in the literature on network governance – that the strategy has to 
somehow fit into functional differentiation – I would also hold that networks are the 
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strategy most likely to succeed. It would seem that democratic could very well be the 
democratic theory of network governance. Or to push the point: democratic elite theory is 
basically network governance as democratic theory.  
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